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Strategic Leadership Primer

**Department of Command, Leadership, and Management
U.S. Army War College**

1998

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
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PREFACE


Strategic Leadership is the “coin of the realm” at the Army’s highest level, and its practice is significantly different in scope, effect, and execution than leadership at lower levels of the organization. The environment at this level is characterized by the highest degrees of uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity, as well as tremendous volatility (VUCA) due to the compression of time in which the leader must act. Strategic leaders find themselves enmeshed in intricate networks of competing constituencies and cooperative endeavors that extend beyond their own organization. The strategic leader must be an expert, not only in his/her own domain of warfighting and leading large military organizations, but also in the bureaucratic and political environment of the nation’s decision-making process. This domain includes both a detailed knowledge of, as well as the interrelationship among, economics, geopolitics, military, and information. Moreover, the leader at this level must interact with a number of actors over which they have minimal influence. The successful strategic leader is the quintessential communicator, using all means of communication. As the organizational spokesman, the strategic leader is constantly required to discuss his/her organization, as well as comfortably interact with the media. The leader’s ability to effectively communicate with the media is a harbinger of organizational success. Whereas leaders at lower levels of the organization remain focused on the short term, strategic leaders must have a “future focus,” spending much of their time looking toward the future and positioning the organization for long-term success.

The study of strategic leadership is an enduring concern of the Army as it educates its senior officer corps to better execute the Army’s role in contributing to our nation’s national security. This **“Strategic Leadership Primer”** defines strategy and strategic leadership in terms of the Army’s role in national security. As Figure 1 depicts, strategic leaders are the group that ascends to the top of the organization where indirect leadership is the norm and there is increased uncertainty and complexity.

Throughout our nation’s history, the Army has been a powerful strategic force in pursuing, achieving, and defending U.S. national security objectives. From the Revolutionary War through Desert Storm to current operations other than war and into the nation’s future, the Army is the entity charged with prosecuting the land war. Only the Army with its physical presence, long term if necessary, can satisfy this enduring strategic imperative. This document discusses the unique aspects of leading this strategic force. This primer is intended to set the stage for a greater understanding and more in-depth study of leadership at the top of organizations -- the context, challenges, characteristics, and requirements of Strategic Leadership.



The Army Leadership Framework



INTRODUCTION

"It became clear to me that at the age of 58 I would have to learn new tricks that were not taught in the military manuals or on the battlefield. In this position I am a political soldier and will have to put my training in rapping-out orders and making snap decisions on the back burner, and have to learn the arts of persuasion and guile. I must become an expert in a whole new set of skills."

Attributed to George C. Marshall

General Marshall is alleged to have made this observation as he reflected upon his early years as Chief of Staff of the United States Army (CSA) in the months prior to World War II. It is obvious from this comment that Marshall believed that his previous education, training, and experience had not adequately prepared him for the leadership role he had embarked upon. As the CSA, his success depended upon his ability to persuade influential people and organizations, both internal and external to the government, to employ their efforts on behalf of his vision of a winning wartime strategy and for the mobilization of the Army necessary to make that strategy a reality. General Marshall's particular insights in this matter support the belief that above the direct and organizational levels is a third level of leadership, the strategic level.

What General Marshall seems to have intuitively understood is that the development of a national strategy and acquiring the associated force structure along with integrating our industrial capabilities to accomplish that strategy requires a complex decision making structure, at national and even international levels. Since the time of Marshall, the political complexity of these national and international decision-making structures has continued to grow. To be effective in the strategic arena our senior military leaders and their staffs must fully understand the strategic vision and strategy formulation process, as well as appreciate the environment and the culture in which they must operate, the competencies they must develop, and finally the tasks they must perform. The operating milieu of the strategic leader is one in which a predicted future is translated into a visionary but achievable future. The changes and initiatives necessary to get from the predicted to the visionary future are then incorporated into a strategy that articulates the "ends, ways, and means." This must be accomplished in a world order where the threats are both diffuse and uncertain, where conflict is inherent yet unpredictable, and where our capability to defend and promote our national interests may be restricted by materiel and personnel resource constraints. In short, an environment marked by volatility, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity (VUCA).

In our constitutionally divided political system where decision making authority is separated from the process of resource allocation, the development and implementation of strategy is inherently more difficult. The process of crafting and executing a coherent

national security strategy and a national military strategy is as much political as it is analytical. Invariably, multiple strategic visions compete for influence and resources. Under the best of circumstances strategy formulation and implementation are heavily influenced by parochial interests, bureaucratic conflict, negotiating, and ultimately compromise. We essentially do what we can agree to do since rational decision making in a democracy is the ability to harmonize competing visions and interests.

The strategic decision making process is broader than the National Command Authority (NCA) to which the military is subordinate and even Congress who provides the financial resources. Strategic leaders and the strategy formulation and execution process operate within the boundaries of what Clausewitz described as the "remarkable trinity"--the government, the military, and the people. Strategy, in both war and peace, that does not achieve a consensus of support from each of these three elements of a nation-state, especially in a democracy, is most vulnerable to failure.

While the ***need of our senior officers to transition*** to the strategic level of leadership is clearly recognized, the leadership skills and qualities developed at the direct and organizational levels are still important. The strategic leader must still exercise direct leadership of his subordinate commanders and staff. At the same time, he is also an executive who must manage and lead a very large and complex organization. The key to a successful transition of strategic leadership is an appreciation for the dramatic increase in scope of leadership responsibilities, an understanding of the unique nature of these increased responsibilities, and the dedication of effort necessary to understand and influence the challenging and dynamic environment in which these leadership responsibilities must be executed. It is incumbent upon the strategic leader and his staff, not only to achieve this mastery of the strategic environment, but to exercise those strategic-leader competencies that will foster accomplishment of their vision within that complex environment.

CHAPTER 1

STRATEGY AND STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP

"Strategic art is the skillful formulation, coordination, and application of ends, ways, and means to promote and defend the nation's interests."

USAWC

"Strategy is the art and science of developing and using political, economical, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat."

DOD Dictionary of Military
and Associated Terms

"Strategic leadership is the process used by a leader to affect the achievement of a desirable and clearly understood vision by influencing the organizational culture, allocating resources, directing through policy and directive, and building consensus within a volatile, uncertain, complex, and ambiguous global environment which is marked by opportunities and threats."

USAWC

Executive leadership: "The set of activities directed toward the development and management of the organization as a whole, including all of its subcomponents, to reflect long-range policies and purposes that have emerged from the executive leader's interactions within and interpretations of the organization's external environment."

Zaccaro

The search for national security strategy periodically opens major policy debates that push us in new, sometimes revolutionary directions. Dramatic changes in the international system have forced us to reevaluate old strategies and look for new focal points amidst the still unsettled debris of the bipolar world. At issue for the Army's strategic leaders are the role of the United States Army in a new world order and our capabilities to defend and promote our national interests in a new environment where threats are both diffuse and uncertain, where conflict is inherent, yet unpredictable.

The strategy paradigm comprised of "ends, ways, and means" has almost universal applicability. It defines objectives, identifies courses of action to achieve them, and provides the resources to support each course of action. The relationships among these elements of strategy allow for planning and the debating of alternative strategic visions and calculations. This paradigm and its application to national strategy and to military strategy are taught to senior military officers at every service college.

The creative core of strategy is the calculated relationship of ends and means. But in the complex decision making structures of a modern nation-state, who defines the ends, who provides the means, and who is responsible for the calculated relationships between the two? Strategy as a rational, calculating process is possible only when a single vision dominates or is shared at every stage of the paradigm. In a politically fragmented system in which decision-making authority is constitutionally separated from the process of resource allocation, the search for strategy is more difficult. It is not a scientific enterprise wherein success depends solely on expertise and the systematic analysis of data. Instead, multiple strategic visions compete for influence and resources. Under the best of circumstances (a consensus on interests, objectives, and threats), strategy formulation is an intensely political process, heavily influenced by parochial interests, conflict, bargaining, personal leadership skills, and ultimately compromise. We do what we can agree to do; rational decision making in a democracy is the ability to harmonize competing strategic visions and interests. That assumption forms the major thesis of this document: *Strategic leaders must be experts in their domain and in the bureaucratic and political environment of the decision making process in a democracy.*

The strategic decision making process is broader than the national command authority in which military subordination to political authority is institutionalized. Strategic leaders, in or out of uniform, operate within the boundaries of what Clausewitz described as the "remarkable trinity". Strategy in war or peace that ignores any one of these is certain to fail because the very essence of strategy is the ability to apply means (resources) to clearly articulated ends (and strategic concepts). In a democracy this requires political consensus among the elements of the Clausewitzian Trinity. The history of our strategic successes and failures is proof of this process.

THE PAST AS PROLOGUE: THE EVOLUTION OF STRATEGY.

The evolution of the United States as an independent nation coincided with a new era in warfare marked by the democratization and industrialization of war and its growing complexity and impact on the Clausewitzian Trinity. At the same time, the vagaries of history and geography combined to give Americans a distinct attitude toward national security. For much of its existence, the U.S. lay sheltered behind broad oceans. The balance of power abroad ensured its insularity and reinforced the premise, basic in American foreign policy, that alliances were contrary to its national interests. With generally friendly neighbors on both borders, the nation benefited from "free security" and could early on define its security in terms of its contiguous frontiers and boundaries.

As a consequence, absolutist ideas of national security took hold. Distinctions between war and peace normally were hard and fast. There were decent intervals between wars, and the nation knew when it was at war and when it was at peace. Soldiers would conduct war; their civilian superiors make peace. To most Americans, war represented an unwelcome disturbance of normal peace and progress. The whole tradition in war was to hold off as long as possible--a tradition that led first to declare, then to prepare. The meaning of the terms "victory" and "winning" were clear. Once the nation became involved in war, the disturber of peace must be thrashed like a bully, given punishment to fit the crime, and the nation return to its normal pursuits as quickly as possible.

It is not surprising, therefore, that when the United States began to look outward as the 20th century began, it did so without the benefit of a well-developed national security strategy. In this context, World War I was an aberration for American strategists. For the first time in its history, the United States engaged in a large-scale war overseas. But American participation in the transatlantic war provided no real test of American national security strategy. Entering the struggle for their own reasons and late, and as usual unprepared, the Americans had limited strategic influence on the conduct of the war. The European partners had already decided the important questions--which enemy to defeat first and where and how to go about it. In effect, they filled the gap in American war planning; they furnished the basic war execution strategy.

Yet participation set important precedents and gave new direction to American planning. The war rooted in the subconscious of the strategists the idea of a major American effort across the Atlantic. Closely tied to this concept was the realization of the importance of Anglo-American control of the Atlantic in order to link the new and old worlds in a common war effort. The idea that the imbalance of power on the European continent might threaten the long-range national security interests of the United States and require overseas ground combat operations in Europe was a revolutionary principle. This extracontinental role of American land forces went far beyond earlier, simple concepts of defense of the homeland that had hitherto dominated national security strategic thinking. For this reason, the prospect that the nation might have to rely on a new strategy--based on large land forces prepared to fight for national security abroad and in advance of a

direct threat to the U.S. continent--was not immediately and squarely faced. The result was a return to the "normalcy" of splendid isolationism in the first post-war transition period of the 20th century. It was a return to a traditional national security strategy that would have, in the coming years, a direct audit trail to World War II.

Even before World War I was over, questions were being raised regarding the traditional American approach to regard strategy in a narrowly military context. Historically, up to World War II most American military strategy in war had been generally self-contained--that is, military and political objectives could be meshed simply. Either there had been no real political threat (the Indian Wars), or the military and political threat coincided (Germany in World War I).

If the United States concentrated its energies on military victory and the immediate foe were decisively beaten, the assumption was the political threat would subside. But in World War II a new political factor was introduced. The more thoroughly the immediate European enemy, Germany, was beaten, the greater loomed another threat - the half-ally, the Soviet Union. The United States found itself confronted in victory with an expansive power whose conflicting national postwar aims had been cloaked by the common military enemy faced in World War II. The final result of World War II was the beginning of the Cold War.

This 45-year conflict, with its war-in-peace dynamic involving all the elements of national power, transformed the purely wartime concept of national security strategy. For the Soviet Union, this transformation had long since taken place because of the influence of the holistic and universalist Marxist-Leninist ideology. As a consequence, Soviet strategic thinking from the beginning did not perceive a major "break" between war and peace, each of which was merely a phase in the larger construct of a belief system that viewed all politics, society, economics, and even warfare from the standpoint of class struggle.

For the United States, however, the transformation in national security strategy occurred in the rapidly unfolding events immediately after World War II with the adjustment not only to international involvement in peacetime, but to the mantle of global leadership as well. National security strategy now emerged as something infinitely more complex and multilayered for American leaders, involving all national elements of power to form long-term domestic and foreign policies. Those policies would act as a guide for decades or, as they had in the case of the Roman Empire, for centuries. In that context, national security strategy was not something that came into existence when a war began or automatically ceased upon conflict termination.

THE ROAD AHEAD: VISIONING, CHANGE, AND CONTINUITY - THREE CONCEPTS TO CONSIDER.

First, strategic leadership during periods of historic transformation need not require a detailed or perfect road map to the future. The post-Cold War period, for example, is too much in flux for that. Having vision can also mean acknowledging that historic changes have taken place as the result of our sudden victory in the Cold War, giving voice to their impact, and galvanizing the bureaucracy, the Congress, and the nation to debate new issues and challenges. Strategic leadership is as much about asking the right questions as it is promoting preferred solutions.

Second, articulating strategic vision, however tentative the vision may be, is made difficult by the unrealistic American concept of victory. To Americans, victory connotes that both a struggle and U.S. involvement have ended, preferably in some unconditional and final form. Military victory, for example, is symbolized by Marines raising the flag on Mt. Suribachi or by dictators signing the documents of unconditional surrender on the decks of U.S. battleships or in remote desert bases surrounded by victorious allied forces. Victory in hot wars or cold ones means that we can withdraw, that our responsibilities have ended, and that our interests are secure.

Good strategy does not recognize the concept of victory. There are no absolute victories; there are only phase lines in a permanent struggle to promote and defend our national interests. At each phase line threats are defeated or recede, the international system reconfigures as old powers decline and new powers rise; and at home, resources are redistributed in support of new priorities and new strategies. But neither the international nor the domestic political systems are static. Only the nation's interests remain relatively constant, requiring new strategies for their promotion and defense.

National security strategy requires the permanent management of the nation's interests through the planning and application of political, economic, and military strategies. Collectively they constitute classical Grand Strategy. What we now describe as National Security Strategy (NSS) relates to the third concept concerning uniting the strategy and political paradigms into a coherent plan of action. The concept of victory as an end state feeds the natural tension between domestic and foreign policy. This tension manifests itself in the debate for resource allocation. Simply stated, every dollar invested in external security is a dollar not available to meet a domestic requirement, and vice versa. This attitude is, to a large degree, the fault of strategists themselves who traditionally promote threat-based rather than interest-based strategies.

A comprehensive interest-based strategy recognizes that grand strategy bridges the gap between foreign and domestic policies in a world in which domestic prosperity is now directly linked to global activism and status. NSS recognizes the organic relationship between foreign and domestic interests and coordinates political, economic, and military power in the pursuit of those interests. The most telling symptom that strategic consensus has broken down is a debate that puts domestic and military spending on a zero-sum collision course. By contrast, strategic vision is the ability to articulate an NSS that

coordinates the allocation of resources to all elements of power--political, economic, and military.

Articulating a strategic vision and mobilizing support on its behalf are not panaceas, but they can minimize the harmful effects to a nation that may be drifting toward political isolationism, militant economic protectionism, or military unpreparedness. These extremes are the antithesis of strategy and can result in tragic intervals of conflict.

The Cold War marked the first time in American history that our strategic leaders were forced to deal with the essential paradox of grand strategy faced by the Roman Empire and other great powers in the intervening centuries: *Si vis pacem, para bellum*--if you want peace, prepare for war. This is a paradox that still exists for the United States in the current post-Cold War transition period, in which a national security strategy of global engagement is supported by a national military strategy focused on *shape, respond, and prepare* with the operational imperative of having to execute two regional contingencies and operations other than war. The key to the success of these strategies still remains the creation of a reasonably instrumental relationship between national ends, ways, and means. And what constitutes "reasonable" in terms of national security in the coming years will depend, as it always has in American history, on the interworkings of the elements of the Clausewitzian Trinity--the government, the people, and the army [military]--which must integrate domestic and international politics. This means, in turn, that civilian and military strategic leadership will have to work harder in this transition period to build a consensus among the American people concerning the increasingly more complex concept of national security. The task is made easier because of the long war-in-peace experience of the Cold War. Patience, perseverance, and endurance in the face of protracted conflict without prospects of clear victory is assuredly a lesson of the "long war." On the other hand, the "long peace" demonstrated that absence of conflict does not necessarily mean tranquility, certainty, or predictability. The Cold War showed at times that it can also mean chaos, uncertainty, and unpredictability. As a result, there is a growing awareness on the part of the American people that the United States faces a situation in the post-cold war transition period similar to that which, in Edward Luttwak's description, confronted the Roman Empire in its later stages:

"The Romans did not face a single enemy, or even a fixed group of enemies, whose ultimate defeat would ensure permanent security. Regardless of the amplitude of Roman victories, the frontiers of the empire would always remain under attack, since they were barriers in the path of secular migration flows from north to south and from east to west. Hence Roman strategy could not usefully aim at total victory at any cost, for the threat was not temporary but endless.

The only rational goal was the maintenance of a minimally adequate level of security at the lowest feasible cost to society."

Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire
by Edward Luttwak. Baltimore, MD:
Johns Hopkins University Press, 1976.
p. 137.

CHAPTER 2

THE STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP ENVIRONMENT

"Environment: The aggregate of social and cultural conditions that influence...life...."

Webster's Third International
Dictionary

Large, complex organizations consist of intricate networks of staff, functional, and operating components. These components interact with each other and with external entities, which are equally as complex, to achieve organizational goals. A strategic leader is an individual, who not only has organizational leadership responsibility, but who must also represent his or her organization in the necessary interaction with that maze of other entities that constitute their organization's external environment. Strategic and organizational leaders must conceptually envision a desired future state for their organization and then direct the flow of internal and the influence of external events toward that end.

Thus, the strategic leadership environment consists of both internal and external complexities that directly and indirectly affect the resourcing, structuring, and operational performance of the organization. The dynamics of a changing threat, the changes in international coalitions, the shifting of public attitudes, the rapid advances in technology, the election of new governments, the fluctuation of national budgets, and the evolution of new missions make the challenges of strategic leadership that much more difficult. The only constant in the strategic environment is the continuous acceleration of the rate of change, which gives rise to greater uncertainties.

The complexities of the strategic environment often make identification of the origins and causes of external influences a difficult process. The magnitude and pace of external change serves to enhance the complexity of the environment and to give rise to greater organizational uncertainty. The organization feels the effects of change; but, without effective strategic leadership, the organization is incapable of influencing that environment to its own benefit.

Within this complex environment, it is an inherent responsibility of the strategic leader to become the master of information and influence. It is essential that the strategic leader know what is happening within the crosscurrents of the organization's external environment. The leader must also understand the dynamics of why it is happening and be consistently alert for the opportunities to influence such events as may be required in furtherance of organizational goals. The strategic leader must develop an association and rapport with a network of knowledgeable individuals in those external agencies and

entities that influence the organization. It is also essential that a strategic leader's staff develop similar networks of contacts at the working level to assure that this multiplicity of networks runs like a root system throughout the external environment. A strategic leader cannot influence external events unless he or she is in timely receipt of relevant information, appreciates the context and significance of such information, and understands exactly the right pressure points where education and persuasion can most effectively be applied in order to influence events for the benefit of the organization.

With an understanding of the external environment and with the development of an established network therein, the strategic leader is in a position to intelligently influence that environment. In applying such influence, the strategic leader uses the access that his or her position accords and applies the communicative arts of education and persuasion. Over time, the strategic leader must build consensus with key players to make the achievement of a strategic vision and associated organizational goals a reality. In undertaking such consensus building, the strategic leader must be willing to compromise, as necessary. Partial achievement of organizational objectives is clearly preferable to no achievement at all. In most instances the complete achievement can be attained at some later time as the dynamics of the external environment shift favorably. The art of influencing the environment can be illustrated by former Joint Chief of Staff Forrestal as told in the following:

"Forrestal's handling of the complicated and politically explosive contracting problem is a representative example of his administrative method. By patient persuasion, by pushing an idea informally, by implementing it on a trial basis, he gradually built a favorable consensus and outwardly persistent in pursuing who disagreed with him. He workability plus frequent, well-timed face-to-face discussion, as one reasonable usually produce a decision acceptable to all , which he then formalized. Although brusque in manner impatient, he was in fact both patient and consultations and negotiations with those was confident that demonstrated restatement of the facts in person to another, could parties."

Driven Patriot: The Life and Times of James Forrestal
by Townsend Hoopes and Douglas Brinkley, p. 161.

The aspects and elements of the external environment that characteristically have had the greatest impact upon the Army as an institution can be categorized as follows: threats, international alliances, national cultures, public opinion, federal budget, technological factors, federal government, private organizations and internal environment. It is incumbent upon the strategic leader to develop a sophisticated understanding of each so that the requisite vision for the organization's future can be effectively developed and the external environment influenced to achieve the long-range accomplishment of that vision.

We will briefly discuss each of these environmental factors and their impact on the Army below.

THREATS.

Of all the variables in the external environment, those with the most effect on our national security are armed threats to our national interests. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a dramatic increase in regional conflicts, civil wars, insurgencies, terrorist activities, weapons proliferation, and drug trafficking. Regional instabilities that threaten our national interests or threaten the lives of our citizens living abroad will require us to unilaterally, multilaterally, or within the United Nations framework, employ Army forces in a variety of hostile and nonhostile circumstances.

The employment of the Army in contingency, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance operations as part of a joint or combined force is an ever-present likelihood. Unfortunately, the volatile and dynamic nature of post-Cold War regional instabilities offers strategic planners an abundance of uncertainties as the only constant in this most complex of international security environments. It is at best difficult and at worst impossible to predict with any reliability which nations or groups in this world may threaten our interests or how and when such threats may emerge. Strategic leaders must ensure that their organizations remain ready to respond to worldwide challenges across the range of military operations as part of a joint and/or combined force.

INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCES.

The requirement to operate effectively in a multinational environment demands an international perspective and an understanding of the various political, economic, and cultural factors that influence decision-making in other countries. Combined operations in alliance or coalition circumstances, or under the auspices of the United Nations, are becoming commonplace. As such, strategic leaders must be aware of who potential enemies may be, who may share common interests in addressing an international threat, what alliances and relationships exist among and between involved nations, and what the political and diplomatic dynamics of the situation may be both internationally and domestically. Strategic leaders must also be aware that the successful conduct of combined operations requires a particular sensitivity to the impact the deployment of United States forces may have on the laws, traditions, and customs of a host country.

NATIONAL CULTURE.

Our Army is a part of our society and, as such, is affected by the influences that mold our societal values and perceptions. Strategic leaders must appreciate that the Army as an organization cannot survive if it isolates and removes itself from the society it serves. It can and should mirror the highest ideals of our society and set standards of conduct that require the total dedication and commitment of those who serve in its ranks. But, in the

final analysis, it must always be a part of our social fabric. An Army that reflects the beliefs and values of American society will inevitably maintain the respect and trust of that society.

PUBLIC OPINION.

Strategic leaders must consistently examine their anticipated decisions and actions and the impact such decisions and actions may have on the mood of the public, on special interest groups, on elements of society likely to be affected, to include their own organizations, and on the media. Strategic leaders must accept that the media thrives on its often adversarial role. The media has no obligation to present an objectively balanced view of the Army as an institution. Indeed, the media in the United States and most other democratic countries is in the business of satisfying the public's desire for news that can produce a visceral or empathetic response.

Strategic leaders must be sensitive to public opinion and the media. They must proactively work to inform the public and the media concerning the Army as an organization and the missions it performs. Credibility is the strategic leaders greatest asset in dealing with the public and the press. He or she must preserve credibility without sacrificing operational security when the lives of soldiers and the success of a mission are at stake. The greatest asset a strategic leader has is the general confidence of the public in the Armed Forces of the United States despite the media emphasis on the "warts" and not the whole organization. The American people do not expect a perfect Army. What they do expect is a competent Army with leadership that deals with problems, takes care of its sons and daughters entrusted to her, and responds to meet the needs of our nation.

FEDERAL BUDGET.

The dynamics of the federal budgeting process strongly influences decision making at the strategic level. Competition for scarce resources among the multiple claimants at the national level is intense. Interest on the national debt, entitlement programs, and the budgetary desires of each department of government combine to stress the federal budget well in excess of our nation's economic ability to resource these demands. Within the Department of Defense, there are far more requirements than financial resources to meet them. Within the context of the Department of Defense programming and budgeting system, strategic leaders are expected to be advocates for the legitimate requirements of their organizations and to provide candid assessments of the risks and consequences of various programming and budgeting alternatives. To be effective in this national system of resource allocation, the strategic leader must understand the programming and budgeting system of the Department of Defense, the role of the Office of Management and Budget, and the Congressional Authorization and Appropriation Process.

TECHNOLOGICAL FACTORS.

Across the range of military operations, technological developments have continued to have significant effect on the capability of the Army to perform its various missions. Technology has given our strategic leaders significant advantages in force projection, command and control, and in the generation of overwhelming and decisive combat power. The technological revolution in warfare has dramatically increased the tempo of operations, the rapidity of maneuver, the precision of firepower, the processing of critical information, and the complexities of command. Technology has also enhanced the ability of the Army to effectively function in a joint, interagency, and combined operational environment. Strategic leaders must possess a broad understanding of relevant military technologies and understand how advancements in each of these technologies can be incorporated into Army organizations, doctrine, and equipment to permit continued advancements in combat effectiveness and efficiency. They must also appreciate how our reliance on technology can be applied against us by a determined adversary.

FEDERAL GOVERNMENT.

Since the Army is subject to civilian government control, strategic leaders must proactively involve themselves with numerous executive, legislative, and judicial organizations and agencies. The Army plays a key advisory role in the development of the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy and in the development of legislation affecting the administration of the Army. Within the parameters of such directive guidance and force of law, strategic leaders develop the necessary strategies, plans, and policies to support and implement National Command Authority and Congressional intent.

Strategic leaders frequently provide counsel to civilian executive authorities and are called upon to testify routinely before committees and subcommittees of both houses of Congress. Additionally, decisions made by strategic leaders are often subject to judicial review by Federal Courts. A critical task that a strategic leader must perform well is the development of an understanding and an ability to influence the multiplicity of external elements within the Federal Government that directly and indirectly impact upon the operations and administration of the Army both in the present and future.

PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS.

An endless number of private organizations, both foreign and domestic, such as defense contractors, interest groups, and military associations make up the external forces which influence the strategy development and policy process. Strategic leaders frequently interact with representatives of these organizations and must ensure that such interactions remain within the parameters of policy guidance and ethical conduct. The manner in which the Army's strategic leadership leverages these private organizations can spell the difference in effectively managing change.

THE INTERNAL ENVIRONMENT.

In many ways the internal environment of the Army and the national military structure is just as complex and demanding as the external environment. It would be impractical to describe all the organizations, systems, and subsystems that exist at the strategic level within and among the Services, the combatant commands, international commands, the Joint Staff, and the Department of Defense. Nor is it practical to describe the multitude of interlocking relationships, lines of communication, and operating dynamics. Suffice it to say that the strategic leader must interact within this complex internal arena to assure that his or her efforts to chart a future path for the Army can be effectively institutionalized both in policy and in culture.

SUMMARY.

It is the strategic leader who transcends the organization by orchestrating internal events, in concert with personal and organizational influence on the external environment, to achieve an organizational vision. Unfortunately, the internal and external environments are complex and dynamic arenas in which the only constants are change and uncertainty. Consequently, it is the strategic leader who must develop the networks necessary to know what is happening within the environment, to appreciate why such events are or will happen, and to discern how best to influence events for the benefit of the organization. The strategic leader must continuously apply himself to building consensus for organizational goals among key players in the environment who have the individual or collective ability to mold events essential to the achievement of the organizational vision. Those elements within the environment that have characteristically had the greatest impact on the Army include: the threat, international alliances, our national culture, public opinion, the federal budgeting process, technology, our national system of government, private organizations, and the internal organization of our Army and the Department of Defense. To be successful, the strategic leader must remain a perpetual student of the environment and remain constantly engaged in the process of influencing that environment.

CHAPTER 3

STRATEGIC VISION

"Where there is no vision, the people perish."
Proverbs 29:18

Strategic leaders develop and communicate a compelling, understandable strategic vision for the organization. That strategic vision is a means of focusing effort and progressing toward a desired future--what ought to be. While the vision is an image of a future state, it is also a process the organization uses to guide future development. An effective vision also requires an implementing strategy or plan to ensure its attainment--how to get there.

Creating the vision is a collaborative effort, with strategic leaders at the focal point of origin. Their competencies, coupled with the authority of their position, bestow upon strategic leaders the unique responsibility and opportunity to establish the long-term strategic intent and objectives of the organization. A strategic vision, properly articulated, can last for decades as illustrated by the following:

"...We hold these truths to be self-evident; that all men are created equal; that they are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness; that to secure these rights, governments are instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed;..."

Declaration of Independence

Our National Vision

Visioning is truly a creative process. It brings together known information and new ideas, integrates these ideas with future technologies and organizational requirements, and blends them into an innovative product. Therefore, the word "create" is purposefully used here. In the process of visioning, leaders forecast the future pragmatically and realistically. They then develop the image of "what ought to be" for the organization to position it for success in a futuristic environment.

*"I believe this nation should commit itself to achieving
the goal, before this decade is out, of landing a man on
the moon and returning him safely to earth."*

John Fitzgerald Kennedy

Once a desired future or vision has been postulated, strategic leaders bridge to the future by means of a strategy and plans. They develop ends (objectives), ways (concepts),

and means (resources) to achieve the vision. Obviously, overt definable objectives make vision attainment more recognizable when it occurs. Definable objectives also provide a way of measuring and evaluating movement toward vision achievement. "Strategy" is the crossover mechanism between the forecast future and the envisioned, desired future.

Strategic leaders identify diverse sources of information both inside and outside the organizational environment and integrate this information into a strategy for change. History, culture, and values of the organization, future trends in society and in the world, the relationship of the organization with other organizations, and the role of the organization within the environment are some of the factors which must be considered.

VALUE OF STRATEGIC VISION.

Vision provides a sense of ultimate purpose, direction, and motivation for all members and activities within the organization. It provides an overarching concept, which serves to initiate and focus more specific organizational goals, plans, and programs. It provides a means of analyzing and understanding the pressures and contingencies of the external environment. The vision helps the organization identify what in the environment is important, what requires action, and what that action should be. It also reinforces or establishes the basic values of the organization or effort and the leader.

*"As I would not be a slave,
so I would not be a master.
This expresses my idea of a
democracy. Whatever differs
from this, to the extent of
the difference, is no
democracy."*

Abraham Lincoln

*"I have a dream that one
day on the red hills of
Georgia the sons of former
slaves and the sons of
former slaveowners will be
able to sit down together
at the table of brotherhood."*

Martin Luther King, Jr.

A vision is the first step in the development of strategies and plans for change, without which there is no clear direction or end. Once the desired vision has been articulated, then the ways and means to achieve it are identified.

CHARACTERISTICS OF A VISION.

The concept of vision has become a popular term within academic, government, defense, and corporate circles. This has spawned many different definitions of vision. As the various definitions are examined, however, some common characteristics and trends begin to emerge.

The term "vision" suggests that a core element is a *visual image*--a mental picture of what the future organization, military effort, or environment will look like. The concept also implies a later time horizon. This time horizon tends to be mid- to long-term in nature, focusing on as much as 10, 20, or even 50 years in the future.

The concept includes an *ideal end state*. This desired end state describes the organization or military effort as it ought to be, given the expected future environment. Consequently, the vision includes appropriate values for the desired future.

The desired end state serves as a goal for the organization or military effort and its participants. It is a goal to be striven for and not necessarily expected to be achieved in its entirety. Thus, the vision provides direction, purpose, and identity. When members perceive it as worth the effort, the vision creates energy, commitment, and belonging. When shared by all participants, the vision can move members of the organization or military effort to significant achievements.

Vision exists at all organizational levels. In very small organizations, it may be an informal, verbally expressed understanding among members and the leader--for example, "best squad in the company." In somewhat larger organizations, it often resides in the leader's philosophy of command, written policy or statements of the leader's intent for the organization or military effort. At the highest strategic levels it is often expressed as a formalized vision statement.

"The Army Vision: The U.S. Army...Trained and Ready for Victory. A Total Force of quality soldiers and civilians...A values-based organization...An integral part of the Joint Team...Equipped with the most modern weapons and equipment...Able to respond to our Nation's needs...Changing to meet the challenges of today . . . tomorrow . . . and the 21st century."

General Dennis J. Reimer
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

Visions at various levels of an organization support and influence the visions of both higher and lower levels of the organization. The top-down alignment of visions for greatest organizational effectiveness is a primary task of leaders.

It is important not to confuse organizational strategic vision with strategic vision used by the National Command Authority and CINCs in deliberate strategic planning. While interrelated, the concepts differ in content. Using the concept of ends (objectives), ways (concepts), and means (resources), vision relates to the ends, while planning focuses on the ways and means to get to the end state. Mid- to long-range planning is more likely to be a direct extrapolation from the current situation. In the context of government, defense, and military vision, "strategic" implies both long-range and high-level.

Simply put, strategic vision is that which is derived from, supports, and influences national security strategy and national military strategy. Of the three components of strategy--ends, ways, and means--vision relates to the ends of strategy. A strategic vision influences and helps define national-level strategy.

CREATING THE VISION.

Vision is the product of a dynamic, logical, and collective organizational process. Vision is often attributed only to leaders because of their critical role in developing and articulating it and their position as the representative of the organization; however, vision is rarely the result of an entirely internal, intuitive process of leaders creating vision in isolation. Vision does not reside only in leaders; rather, vision is developed as a collaborative effort, with leaders performing the critical role of integrating and guiding the process.

Though far from simple, the visioning process consists primarily of examining the organizational environment, projecting likely future states of the organization, and developing a desired end state. In this task, leaders are assisted by the collaborative efforts of key members of the organization: deputies, staff chiefs, subordinate leaders, and senior noncommissioned officer advisors. Visioning may frequently be an informal process; however, at very high levels of organization, temporary or permanent specialized staffs--so-called "think tanks" or "futures groups" often assist leaders in this complex task.

The visioning process begins with an assessment of the organizational environment, history, mission, values, and trends to determine which are most likely dominant in determining the future of the organization. From the examination of the past and present environment, organizations and leaders project into the future and develop likely alternative future states. They must assess the future environment and state of the organization as objectively and realistically as possible. However, visualizing the future is a significantly less precise process than examining the present environment because of the unlimited number of potential future world environments. While no one can accurately predict the future, it is possible to develop a range of possible future states and their likelihood of occurrence. From these plausible states of the future, organizations and leaders derive a desirable end state. However, this entails more than simply selecting one of the likely future states. Forming the vision is a creative process in which intuition and experience play critical roles.

Creation of a vision involves the active use of intuition--perceiving without the conscious use of reasoning. This is not mystical or magical; intuition is the result of human experience. Past experience in analyzing, integrating, and synthesizing information equips leaders with "frames of reference"--the ability to perceive new information, relationships, and possibilities. Drawing from knowledge and values stored in the mind during years of experience, leaders create and synthesize a unique vision. Although the

collaboration of other members of the organization is important, it is leaders whose experience, values, frames of reference, and position contribute most to the creation of the vision.

Integrating values with known information, innovative ideas, likely futures, and organizational requirements, the vision of the future becomes what "ought to be"--a plausible and desirable organizational end state. This desirable end state is a developed vision when it has been articulated and evaluated. Articulating the vision--converting it into a cogent vision statement--enables the leader to communicate the vision in a compelling, understandable manner.

Complex visions captured in a few words, a sentence, or a paragraph can inspire and guide large organizations; for example:

"Global Reach, Global Power."

U.S. Air Force Vision Statement

The vision statement is flexible enough to accommodate a range of plausible futures and contains values which make it worthy of the effort required to achieve it; for example:

"Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist."

George Catlett Marshall

A very brief vision statement can convey a conceptual image broad and powerful enough to give authority and validity to more detailed, but less easily remembered, descriptions of the vision; for example:

"...From the Sea."

U.S. Navy Vision Statement

"...With a far greater emphasis on joint and combined operations, our Navy and Marine Corps will provide unique capabilities of indispensable value in meeting our future security challenges. American Naval Forces provide powerful yet unobtrusive presence; strategic deterrence; control of the seas; extended and continuous on-scene crisis response; project precise power from the sea; and provide sealift if larger scale scenarios emerge. These maritime capabilities are particularly well suited for the forward presence and crisis response missions articulated in the United States National Security Strategy."

U.S. Navy Vision Statement Elaboration

Before the vision is implemented, the leader evaluates it for accuracy, consistency, and utility. When the vision statement accurately depicts organizational goals, is consistent with requirements, and communicates the leader's intent, the vision is ready for implementation.

STRATEGY FOR CHANGE.

*“Vision without action is merely a dream.
Action without vision just passes the time.
Vision with action can change the world.”*

Joel A. Barker
The Power of Vision

Vision is a critical element in three essential organizational processes: Development of culture, management of change, and interaction with the environment. Leaders implement the vision to:

- (1) Shape the organizational culture: Create, revise, or reaffirm organizational purpose, direction, energy, identity, and values.
- (2) Create change: Move the organization toward a more effective future state.
- (3) Positively influence: Shape the environment of the organization.

This list implies three concurrent vision-related tasks for the leader, two internal to the organization and one external.

Within the organization, leaders work to gain member acceptance of the vision, appeal to shared values to make the vision personally relevant to members, and demonstrate actions which are consistent with the vision. But, members of the organization need time to analyze and understand fully the implications of a new vision. Therefore, leaders seek to convince key players within the organization that the vision is correct and viable. Leaders communicate the vision to all members in a clear, concise, and believable manner.

ABRAMS ON READINESS

“Another of the first things Abrams did (as Army Chief of Staff) was to address Army personnel assigned to the various senior service schools. What he told them was an indication of how he intended to go about

cleaning up the inherited mess. 'We need more professional toughness at every level of the Army,' he told them. And he spelled out the central mission. 'I consider the basic task of the Army to be readiness.'

Readiness as he defined it involved training, equipment, and people, but even more important it involved a state of mind. That state of mind, or attitude, included 'devotion to duty and service, and a dedication to being competent, professional soldiers' with a positive approach to tasks, mental flexibility, receptivity to change both inside and outside the Army, and action instead of lip service."

Thunderbolt--From the Battle
of the Bulge to Vietnam and
Beyond by Lewis Sorley, p. 346.

Achieving commitment of the members of the organization is easiest when they have contributed to development of the vision. However, many worthwhile visions require radical change and are initially unacceptable to members of the organization. Leaders anticipate resistance to change and work to overcome it.

MARSHALL'S VISION FOR THE ARMY AIR CORPS

"As Deputy Chief of Staff, he had observed that air officers had almost no representation on the General Staff and that most General Staff officers had little interest in air-related matters. In fact, there was a strong anti-air bias...Marshall found this situation deplorable, but decided to move cautiously. In his view, the Air Corps formed a particularly critical part of the combined-arms team to be forged. Ground and air officers had to grow to understand and respect each others' roles if anything approaching the necessary teamwork between them could be realized. This mutual understanding and respect could not be dictated; it had to be nurtured so it could flourish of its own accord. This was Marshall's approach. He intended to increase incrementally the autonomy of the Air Corps within the Army, in the process developing its leaders so they could perform respectably as senior commanders and staff officers. In fact, Marshall aimed to give the Air Corps all the autonomy it could handle. However, he kept this intention fairly close-hold, making it really a semi-hidden aspect of his strategic vision. To have articulated this openly would have ignited a fire storm of attention, under-mining his efforts to effect subtly, almost imperceptible attitudinal and organizational changes. Marshall thus envisioned an autonomous Air Corps, working harmoniously with ground forces to form the 'perfect combined-arms team,' in addition to performing strategic bombing missions apart from the ground forces."

General George C. Marshall:
Strategic Leadership and the Challenges of Reconstituting
the Army, 1939-1941, by John T. Nelson, pp. 14-15.

If successful, the vision is integrated into the permanent culture of the organization; members internalize the vision and behave in ways which are consistent with it. To the extent that subordinate organizations and leaders embrace the top-down vision, their visions align with the vision of senior leaders.

To create permanent change in the organization, leaders plan the ways and means necessary to achieve the end state of the vision; otherwise, the change will not survive the tenure of the leader. Institutionalizing the vision in structural change ensures that it will endure. An excellent example of this is the restructuring of the Army under Chief of Staff General Abrams.

ABRAMS ON THE RESERVE COMPONENTS

"One of the most fateful decisions of the war in Vietnam had been Lyndon Johnson's refusal to call up the reserves. All the Joint Chiefs, but especially Harold K. Johnson, the Army Chief of Staff, had found this a very traumatic thing; Johnson even coming close to resigning in protest--and at the end of his life describing his failure to do so as his greatest regret. Abrams as Vice Chief of Staff during the buildup for Vietnam had to cope with the disabilities induced by the lack of mobilization. Now, as Chief of Staff, he appeared determined to ensure that never again would a President be able to send the Army to war without the reserves maintained for such a contingency. The vehicle for doing this was a revised force structure that integrated reserve and active force elements so closely as to make the reserves virtually inextricable from the whole."

Thunderbolt--From the Battle
of the Bulge to Vietnam and
Beyond by Lewis Sorley,
pp. 361-364.

External to the organization, leaders build consensus for the validity of their organizational vision. An accepting environment enhances the success of the organization; influential visions attract resources and interest. At the highest levels of military organization, the vision relates to the national military strategy and the national security strategy. Such visions compete for influence and resources in the democratic institutions which define the national strategy.

At the strategic level, leaders need to acquire resources and build consensus in a variety of constituencies; for example: other Services, national political leaders, Congress, the press, and the public at large. The resources essential to pursuing the vision are influenced by these members of the organizational external environment. There, leaders obtain approval and resources by demonstrating that the vision is a correct, necessary, and viable element of the national military strategy.

SUMMARY.

Vision is the leader-focused, organizational process that gives the organization its sense of purpose, direction, energy, and identity. This process exists at every level and in every type of organization; its content is the desired end state of the organization. For that reason, vision adds value by providing the means for the organization to anticipate and move toward the future.

Visions generally increase in complexity and extend in time frame at successively higher levels of organizations. At the organizational level where vision relates directly to national military strategy and national security strategy, this process is called strategic vision. A strategic vision competes for influence and resources in the development of national strategy.

Leaders at every level of organizations are the custodians, developers, and articulators of vision. From the small section leader to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, leaders guide the organizational definition of the desired end-state. Only leaders possess the decision authority, perspective, position, and experience to derive a vision from the environment, values, and potential of the organization.

Leaders also cause continual evaluation and refinement of the vision in response to changes both internal and external to the organization. The measure of merit of the vision is both objective and subjective--the degree to which the organization accomplishes its mission, at present and in the future.

CHAPTER 4

STRATEGIC CULTURE

Organizational Culture (Strategic Culture) is a pattern of shared basic assumptions, values, beliefs, and norms that the organization has learned over time and that unite the members of an organization. (E. Schein)

An organization that has a well-established history also has a mature, well-developed organizational culture, often referred to as **Strategic Culture**. In large complex organizations like the Army there will be many different subordinate organizations that have developed their own organizational subcultures. For example, the cultures of the Army's heavy and light forces, special operating forces, civilians, and reserve components all differ somewhat, but they embody the same basic values and beliefs of the Total Army's culture. Subcultures developed within these formal or informal groups, like those in the various components, branches, and functional areas, must express and share the core Army organizational culture. A major challenge of strategic leadership, therefore, is to ensure that all these subcultures are compatible with the desired core culture. The purpose of this chapter is to describe organizational culture, discuss its importance, and provide insights on how strategic leaders manage it.

CULTURE.

Organizational culture is the set of institutional, stated, and operating values, beliefs, and assumptions that people have about their organization that are validated by experiences over time. It evolves in consonance with the values, beliefs, and assumptions of the society in which the organization exists.

Values are statements of what is important to an organization. Organizational culture is built on values that are derived from and deemed essential by the strategic leadership of the organization. Our nation's culture derives from a unique set of values expressed in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. These values influence every facet of society, its laws, domestic programs, and foreign relations. The Army's core cultural values are expressed in FM 100-1 and FM 22-100.

Throughout the Army's history, successive strategic leaders have identified and defined institutional values. These values are presented, described, and promulgated in doctrinal literature. The core and institutional values serve as the foundation on which strategic leaders develop stated values. In turn, these stated values form the basis for the development of policies, programs, and procedures within the organization. These policies, programs, and procedures reflect the operating values of the institution. Operating values are communicated in a variety of ways, both verbally and in writing, and many eventually evolve into revised institutional values.

Strategic leaders must be sensitive to the fact that statements of values alone have little impact on organizational culture unless the members internalize them through a process that includes experience-based validation. Only then will stated values result in the desired effect on members' attitudes and behavior.

Individual perceptions of what is important form members' operating values which in turn effect the shaping of the Army's organizational culture. These individual perceptions are effected by the members' interpretation of the cause and effect relationship between the institutional and stated values and what is actually happening within the organization. This is the experienced- based validation process.

In the following vignette, Admiral Crowe demonstrates the consistency between institutional values and stated values, and their corresponding impact on operating values. In this instance the value addressed is the empowerment of subordinate leaders to execute their mission without inordinate "assistance" from above. The date is April 30, 1975. The event is the evacuation of the U.S. Embassy in Saigon. As Admiral Crowe tells it, the protagonists are: MG Smith, the U.S. Army commander at the Embassy, and the Pacific commander, to whom MG Smith was responsible. The circumstance is a radio conversation between the protagonists, MG Smith, below ground at the Embassy in Saigon, and his senior officer in Hawaii. MG Smith informs Hawaii that the helicopters are due in three minutes, six to seven floors above him.

MG SMITH: "*O.K. Admiral, I'm signing off here. I'm going up to meet the helicopters.*"

The PACIFIC COMMANDER, following a break in the conversation:
"Homer, Homer!"

The RADIO OPERATOR: "*Admiral, General Smith has gone to meet the helicopters. I'll get him right down.*"

MG SMITH, somewhat breathless: "*Yeah, go ahead, I'm on the circuit.*"

The PACIFIC COMMANDER: "*Homer, Homer, tell the people going out to those helicopters to keep their heads down!*"

ADMIRAL CROWE, who had monitored the conversations while in the Pentagon concludes: "*Homer Smith was in the middle of evacuating his command--the most important event in his life. He didn't have room in his head for all the headaches he had. The last thing in the world he or anybody with him had to be told was to keep their heads down. It was a marvel that Smith was able to keep his self-control when he received this*

helpful piece of advice. I resolved right then and there that I was not going to interfere with commanders in the field, if at all avoidable."

The Line of Fire by Admiral
William J. Crowe, Jr., p. 142.

A problem occurs when the institutional value of individual responsibility, the stated value of empowering leaders at all levels to execute their responsibilities, and the operating values are in conflict. The anticipated result might be the suppression of individual initiative, innovation, adaptation, and resourcefulness, and the development of timorous military leadership.

Institutional values, stated values, and operating values should reflect the same underlying beliefs and assumptions. The greater the difference, the greater the degree of distrust and loss of confidence between the leadership and the led. This, in turn, results in a decrease of organizational effectiveness. Carried to extreme, the differences could negatively affect the public's trust and confidence in the organization. Therefore, building and sustaining a culture based on trust and confidence, vertically and horizontally, is a key responsibility of strategic leadership. Strategic leaders must ensure institutional and stated values are consistent with the values of both the larger society and the needs of the organization. They must also ensure through policy, doctrine, regulations, and implementing procedures that they produce the desired results.

Over time, the culture becomes so embedded within the organization that much of it is second nature and often taken for granted. Culture establishes a basic sense of what the organization stands for and how it functions. It enables members of the organization to understand and cope with the internal and external environment while accomplishing organizational goals. It also influences how members perceive, think, and act in relation to each other as well as to internal and external challenges and opportunities.

Cultural values define the boundaries of acceptable thought and behavior from such simple acts as the wearing of the uniform to more complex actions such as conducting combat operations. Culture influences how individuals talk to each other, approach problems, anticipate and judge situations, develop expectations, determine right from wrong, establish priorities, and react to many other aspects of organizational and interpersonal behavior.

The following vignette demonstrates the culture of embedded Army values (e.g., selfless service, personal courage, and loyalty) and quiet professionalism that resides in the U.S. Army and, in this instance, in the U.S. Army Special Forces.

After years of operational experience in ". . . the jungle-like world of multiple dangers, hidden traps, unpleasant surprises, and moral ambiguities . . ." a culture has developed within Special Forces that recognizes the strategic implications of allowing any

American, alive or dead, to fall into the hands of the enemy. So, on 3 October 1993, while on a mission in Mogadishu, Somalia, two Special Forces Non commissioned Officers, MSG Gary Gordon and SFC Randall Shughart, had a very brief conversation with their commanding officer. Having seen another helicopter shot down, they circled above it in the helicopter they were in, and directed fire on the enemy who was rapidly maneuvering toward the crash site. They recognized the extreme hazard to the Americans on the ground and to anybody attempting to intervene on their behalf. Nevertheless, in quiet, professional conversation, they requested authority to insert themselves at the crash site. Initially, their commander refused their request in anticipation of a larger force maneuvering to within striking distance of the site. MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart, recognizing the needs at the site, repeated their request. Their commander accepted their appraisal and authorized their insertion. Unfortunately, the complexities of urban maneuver prevented the larger force from arriving in time to support MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart before they were overwhelmed by the advancing Somali militiamen. For their selfless service and quiet professionalism in defense of their countrymen, MSG Gordon and SFC Shughart were awarded the Medal of Honor. They saw their duty and, in a disciplined response, they did it.

Because of the culture shared between these non commissioned officers and their commander, the entire conversation was conducted in three brief radio calls and a handful of words.

(After Action Report and conversation with ground force commander)

Customs and traditions of the Service, doctrine promulgated through field manuals, policies established in regulations, standard operating procedures, and the stated philosophy that guides the organization are some important ways that culture is made visible. Culture is also conveyed through professional journals, historical and biographical publications, audiovisual media, ceremonies, and the folklore of the organization. All these things describe some aspect of the Army's organizational culture.

CULTURE vs CLIMATE.

We should not confuse climate with culture. Climate is a short-term phenomenon created by the current leadership. Consequently, dramatically different climates may exist simultaneously among the various elements of the organization. The most important determinant of climate is the behavior of leaders. Their behavior directly reflects their perception of people; leadership and management style; skills, knowledge, and attitude; and priorities. Every member of the organization knows that leaders, by their action and inaction, signal what they will or will not tolerate. The leader's behavior creates a climate that influences everyone in the organization.

On the other hand, culture is a long-term, complex phenomenon. Individual leaders cannot easily create or change culture. It is part of the organization. It influences the characteristics of the climate by its effect on the behavior and the thought processes of the leader.

While strategic leaders focus their attention on organizational culture, they are also responsible for the climate of the organization over which they exert the most direct influence. The leader contributes to creating a positive climate when his or her behavior reflects competence and the underlying values, beliefs, and assumptions of the organization. Unit members, committed to the organization's culture, will not accept a climate imposed upon them by a leader if it contradicts cultural values, beliefs, and assumptions. Erratic swings in the organization's climate or a persistently negative climate erodes the trust and confidence of the members and adversely affects the organization's readiness and effectiveness.

CULTURAL CHANGE.

Excellence in leadership is reflected in the effective leadership and management of change within an institution, not in the routine execution of daily responsibility.

The engine for cultural change is the vision of the strategic leader. The ability of strategic leaders to shape organizational culture and values to support the vision while retaining the trust and confidence of all concerned is a major challenge for strategic leaders. There is an interactive dynamic between the development of a vision and cultural change. The process of formulating a vision is greatly influenced by culture and values; conversely, the pursuit and achievement of vision influences culture and values. External influences also initiate cultural change. Laws passed by Congress, executive decisions, changes to national military strategy, and technology advancements are some of the more significant ways to influence cultural change. Culture cannot be managed in the traditional sense. It is deeply embedded within the psyche of the people and the structure and functions of the organization. However, the actions and behaviors of strategic leaders can influence, direct, and sustain the culture. Some examples are described below.

Culture is influenced by what is paid attention to, measured, and controlled. The established priorities along with the policies and systems to deal with them send clear signals about what is important and what the leader expects of the members of the organization. For example, strategic leaders can convey to the organization that leader development is an important part of the Army's culture by establishing a system and process to control and measure how effectively it is being accomplished. By contrast, when leader development is mere rhetoric and receives no support, then subordinates will most likely put less energy into developmental activities and concentrate on those activities perceived to be more important.

The allocation of resources can change or influence culture. Resourcing patterns clearly determine what the organization deems as important. The full spectrum of activities associated with the routine of running the Army is continually evaluated for its relative importance, as indicated by how well they are resourced. People are more attentive to those programs or policies that they perceive to be higher in priority by virtue of those programs or policies receiving a greater share of resources.

The structure of the organization also changes or sustains the culture. How the organization is structured has a significant effect on its culture and its capability to express the vision. For example, multilayered organizations tend toward more bureaucracy, less flexibility and innovation, and more cumbersome communications than those with fewer layers. Decision-making authority tends to be retained at higher levels, and empowerment downward becomes more difficult. If more empowerment and greater freedom of action are necessary in achieving the organization's vision, then the strategic leader should design structures and processes to reflect this. The strategies designed to achieve the vision need complementing, supportive organizational structure, and processes to support them.

Criteria for rewards and sanctions emphasize culturally desirable behavior. Members learn about their organization's culture through its personnel selection, promotion, development, and separation systems. Rewards and sanctions associated with different skills, knowledge, attitude, and behavior from entry level onward clearly demonstrate the cultural values and priorities of both the chain of command and the organization.

Leaders are always role models. Members of the organization, and society in general, closely scrutinize the behavior of strategic leaders. How strategic leaders conduct themselves during routine periods and in times of crisis demonstrates their personal values, beliefs, and assumptions. Therefore, their behavior affects certain aspects of the organization's culture as subordinates react to strategic leaders' behavior.

Changing organizational culture is difficult but not impossible. In fact cultural change is imperative if an organization is to grow, develop, and adapt to the changing environment within which it exists. However, it takes time to change an organization's culture, usually between five and ten years, so the strategic leadership of an organization must have patience to see change through. Some examples of significant cultural changes that have occurred in the Army since World War II are listed below:

- Integration of black soldiers into all skills, branches, and units of the Army.
- Development of recruiting, training, sustainment, and separation systems to support an all-volunteer force.
- Abolition of the Women's Army Corps and integration of women into all skills, branches, and units other than those involved in direct combat.

The cultural changes connected with each of these developments evolved over long periods, several years in most cases. External forces triggered some of them, while other changes occurred because of a perceived need for change within the Army. Whatever the reason behind them, far-reaching actions by a succession of strategic leaders helped bring about the desired cultural change.

SUMMARY.

The Army's culture is defined by institutional, stated, and operating values, and the beliefs and assumptions of its members. Culture influences norms of thought and behavior and establishes a basic understanding of what the Army stands for and how it functions. Strategic leaders cannot easily manipulate culture. However, the essence of strategic leadership is the ability to shape an organization's culture and values to support a vision while retaining the trust and confidence of subordinates and members of the greater society.

The Army reflects the vision of our forefathers and their culture, which was validated through experience and articulated in the Constitution and its amendments. Its culture of selfless service is reflected in the following observation by General Dick Cavazos.

"War is always and will ever be obscene, but faced with a greater obscenity, slavery, I would fight. While war is obscene, those who charge the machine guns, who bleed, who go down to the aid stations and who are put in body bags are not obscene; their sacrifices have no measure--theirs has a purity where mankind shines and is beyond corruption. I am not blasphemous when I say that in the brutality and evil of war, soldiers who have offered themselves up, so that their buddies may live, have in them the likeness and image of God. And damn those who debunk courage, valor, fidelity, love of country, and love of home, family, hopes and dreams for a better tomorrow. Our soldiers give up much that others may live--not only in freedom but even in luxury. They deserve our great, great gratitude and affection because they are willing to serve. They are some of God's noblest people."

General Dick Cavazos

CHAPTER 5

STRATEGIC LEADER COMPETENCIES

Competencies are the knowledge, skills, attributes, and capacities which enable a leader to perform his required tasks. A competency may be based on natural ability or may be derived from education, training, or experience.

In general, strategic leader competencies are built on the foundation of leadership requirements at lower levels. In some cases, they are simply the same skills applied at higher levels. For example, the best leaders at all levels have a remarkable capacity to care for subordinates and to respect their dignity as individuals. But some strategic leader competencies are qualitatively different and new. As an example, leaders at direct and organizational levels do not generally need the capacity to envision long-range future requirements in order to set in motion very long development programs. Further, they do not need the level of integrative thinking skills required of strategic leaders.

The major categories of leadership competencies are conceptual, technical, and interpersonal. Strategic conceptual competencies include the thinking skills needed to understand and deal with the complex and ambiguous strategic world. Technical competencies include knowledge of external political, economic, and cultural systems that impact the organization. Interpersonal competencies include consensus building, both internal and external to the organization, and the capacity to communicate effectively (see Appendix A).

CONCEPTUAL COMPETENCIES.

Strategic leaders require the capacity to deal with extraordinary complexity. There is an environment of tough, competing issues, few of which have clear solutions and all of which pose risks. Many issues have more than one feasible resolution, but with no solution either totally acceptable or without cost. It is important to understand such issues fundamentally and accurately to determine the underlying threads that may connect apparently unrelated issues and to chart actions that will have the best long-term outcomes. In so doing, an understanding of second- and third-order effects is necessary to resist actions that may appear reasonable in the short run but are detrimental in the long term. Strategic conceptual competencies include frame of reference development, problem management, and envisioning the future.

Frame of Reference Development. Every leader builds a complex knowledge structure over time from schooling, experience, and self-study. For the strategic leader, this knowledge structure is a “map” of the strategic world; it is a dynamic representation

of the significant factors in the strategic environment with cause-and-effect interrelationships. A frame of reference acts as a basis of observation and judgment.

Three attributes are essential for building a good frame of reference. First, the leader must be open to new experiences and to input from others including subordinates. Second, the leader must be reflective, not afraid to rethink past experiences and learn from them. Third, he must be comfortable with abstracts and concepts common in the strategic environment.

This cannot be taught by conventional classroom methods. A frame of reference is developed by the individual over time as he reflects and makes sense of new knowledge and experience. Frames of reference form as leaders progress from the direct through the organizational to the strategic leadership levels. Individual initiative is important in developing a broad frame of reference. Consequently, part of becoming a strategic leader is approaching this mental activity as intrinsically interesting and rewarding.

"One of your greatest challenges in the Pentagon is trying to explain to other people the problems down at the fighting level. So many of those guys started out as vice presidents and worked their way up. They never had an appreciation of what goes on down there at the lowest level. Powell had the advantage of going up through those levels. For the younger leaders in Vietnam, there was a tremendous moral and ethical challenge that was never faced by the commanders in World War II. When a guy is steeped in the moral and ethical issues down at the fighting level he's more inclined to back off from gross solutions and try to equate what they are saying to how difficult it would be to implement it down where he remembers it. Powell was the first Chairman who had that experience and was able to carry it up through the ranks."

Quote of Ret General Mike Lynch
by Howard Means in Colin Powell: Soldier/Statesman--Statesman/Soldier, p. 266.

Much like the intelligence analyst, the strategic leader, equipped with a well-developed frame of reference, templates events that may have no discernable pattern to his subordinates. He is more able to understand the true situation and, most importantly, know where these events are likely to lead if no intervention occurs. Such leaders are uniquely equipped to deal with events having complex causes and to envision creative solutions. This enables timely and proactive decision-making.

A well-developed frame of reference also gives the strategic leader a thorough understanding of organizational subsystems. This understanding enables visualizing the interactive dynamics of the total system. Appreciation for these interdependencies helps

to ensure that decisions taken in one area will not have an unanticipated adverse impact in others. Without this capacity, changes in policy, regulation, or action may indirectly produce other changes that are neither anticipated nor desired.

Problem Management. Management of strategic problems deals with issues that are competing, that have manifold implications which are often difficult to understand completely, and that have potentially catastrophic outcomes if not resolved carefully. There are no “right” answers. Strategic leaders must be able to think families of issues through as systems so that decisions move the problem as a whole toward resolution. This involves applying past experiences, identifying and creating patterns, discarding nonuseable data, understanding second- and third-order effects, maintaining flexibility, and knowing what is an acceptable outcome for the system as a whole. It also involves working and thinking interactively and not solving problems piecemeal.

Problem management and decision making are two distinct activities. The first involves managing the problems towards the desired outcome--making adjustments, modifying the initial approach, and discarding alternatives that inhibit progress. Many of the most significant problems at the strategic level require this approach because simple and direct alternative courses of action do not exist. The second involves developing alternative courses of action, assessing probability of success, and pursuing the selected course of action. *This differentiation between problem management and decision-making is a major element in the transition from direct to more indirect leadership.* Most past training and work experiences at the direct level are based on developing short-term solutions and deciding on relatively well structured problems by choosing among alternative courses of action. Long-term, ill-defined problems for which it is difficult to envision desired outcomes are not frequently encountered at lower levels. These are the problems, however, that strategic leaders frequently encounter.

Strategic leadership requires a refined ability to recognize and avoid irrelevant and marginal issues. An important ability in working strategic issues is to see beyond the immediately obvious in information received and to know what information is missing. This includes recognizing multiple paths to the same goal, understanding the opportunity costs for each path, and foreseeing the indirect effects of each.

Additionally, acceptance of some degree of risk is essential. Strategic issues are generally ill defined and most information available is ambiguous and incomplete. Most possible courses of action have such complex second- and third-order effects that completely accurate prediction of their outcomes is not possible. This necessitates committing to decisions and operating effectively under conditions of uncertainty. In the force of risk, the ability to recognize and seize opportunities is evident most clearly in the effectiveness with which the strategic leader identifies relevant information, understands the significance of projects or activities of others to his own strategic direction, and discards distractors.

Envisioning the Future. The capability to formulate and articulate strategic aims and key concepts is perhaps the strategic leader's most significant capacity, the application of which was discussed in Chapter 3, Strategic Vision. He must lead the organization in the development of strategic plans to address mid- and long-term programs designed to achieve the strategic aims. This demands an understanding of the interaction of ends, ways, and means as they work to form a strategy. A staff of strategists may develop and refine the strategy, but the strategic leader provides the direction, the concept, and the focus.

This involves not only the ability to envision the future but also to work proactively to shape the future environment to enhance goal attainment. At the strategic level, goals may be far-reaching and should be formulated to accommodate contingencies that reflect the organization's relationship to a changing environment. This requires the thinking and processing of information creatively outside the established boundaries. It is an ability to see the organization and environment not as it is but rather as it should be.

"The researcher scratches in vain for a single instance in all the years of the war when Washington ever lost sight of the objectives for which he was fighting. From first to last, he never added to or subtracted from the vision of a United States free of Europe and supreme in North America. Achieving that was victory. In those terms, and those alone, he unfalteringly devised his strategy."

The Way of the Fox by
David R. Palmer, p. 2-3.

TECHNICAL COMPETENCIES.

Strategic leader technical competencies differ significantly from those skills required at the direct or organizational level. While the technical skills used at lower levels are important elements of the strategic leader's frame of reference, they usually are not directly relevant to the specific tasks at the higher level. At the strategic level, technical competencies include an understanding of organizational systems, an appreciation of functional relationships outside the organization, and knowledge of the broader political and social systems within which the organization operates.

"The crucial military difference (apart from levels of innate ability) between Washington and the commanders who opposed him was that they were sure they knew all the answers, while Washington tried every day and every hour to learn."

George Washington in the American Revolution (1775-1783) by James Thomas Flexner, p. 535.

Systems Understanding. At the organizational level, leaders understand how their organizations operate and how to foster conditions that enable them to be more effective. At the strategic level there is decreased concentration on internal process and system integration and increased concentration on how the organization fits within the total Department of Defense (DOD) framework and into the broader international arena. Organizational systems at these levels have complex inter-relationships, and strategic leaders may have numerous reporting and coordinating relationships. Thus the leader must understand the separate roles he plays, the boundaries of these roles, their demands and constraints, and the expectations of other departments and agencies.

Joint and Combined Relationships. National force projection necessitates an understanding of joint and combined operations. Different nations have different operating practices and principles which impact operations of a combined force. Similarly, each Service has developed a different culture, vocabulary, and expectation for its members. Strategic leaders know how to operate in a multicultural environment to gain the full understanding and commitment of their subordinates.

"Thus General Powell became Chairman determined to reshape national military strategy and the Armed Forces to meet the new environment. He has found that when he was National Security Adviser that what the military produced often did not meet policymaker's needs, and he resolved that this would not happen during his tenure as Chairman. He believed that, as a result of the Goldwater-Nichols reform, it was his responsibility as Chairman to initiate a change in strategy, and he did not wish to be accused of not responding to world events."

The Development of the Base Force
1989-1992, Lorna S. Jaffe, p. 13.

Political and Social Competence. The ability to participate effectively in the interdepartmental process in national security policy formulation and execution is fundamental. Just as important is the capacity for interacting with the legislative branch. It is necessary to advise in developing the policy, preparing the strategy, and working to secure adequate resources to implement the strategy. Leaders at the strategic level function as members of the policy formulation team, helping to determine national interest and objectives. They present a balanced argument of national security requirements, benefits, costs, and risks.

Additionally, the social culture within an organization significantly impacts operations. Critical for strategic leaders is understanding the relationship between stated and operating values. Concomitantly, they establish feedback mechanisms that inform them of the impact on stated values of doctrine, policies, procedures, rules, and behaviors.

INTERPERSONAL COMPETENCIES.

Strategic leader interpersonal competencies include the ability to build consensus within the organization, the ability to negotiate with external agencies or organizations in an attempt to shape or influence the external environment, and the ability to communicate internally and externally.

Consensus-Building. In contrast with organizational-level leaders, strategic leaders devote far more of their time dealing with outside organizations and with leaders of other Services or nations. Consensus on an issue is necessary if coordinated and effective action is to be taken. Consensus-building is a complicated process based on effective reasoning and logic, which may take place over an extended period. Strategic leaders must be persuasive yet willing to compromise when necessary. Consensus building is different from directing or commanding. While strategic leaders, like organizational leaders, may issue direct orders, such orders have less force in the complex strategic world. In working with peers, it is imperative to reach consensus. Peers will not respond to orders. In essence, the process of consensus building is insurance that effective reasoning has taken place and that contentious issues have been resolved. This gains commitment to long-term goals that likely extend.

"The hindsight of the historian can only reinforce Washington's conviction that the crucial battles of the war were in the arenas of public opinion. There can be no doubt that the British were totally outclassed in the warfare for the minds of men. It was in those mental arenas that the civilian-soldier George Washington shone the brightest. He kept forever in mind, as more radical statesmen of either the right or the left could not do, that the fundamental objective was not to foster division but to increase unity."

George Washington in the American Revolution (1776-1783) by James Thomas Flexner, p. 534.

Negotiation. As stated earlier, many relationships at the strategic level are lateral and without clear subordination. In many of these relationships strategic leaders must rely heavily on negotiating skills. Successful negotiation requires a range of interpersonal skills. Perhaps the most important is the ability to stand firm on nonnegotiable points while simultaneously communicating respect for other participants. Personal attributes underlying this ability are skill in listening, skill in diagnosing unspoken agendas, and the capacity to detach oneself personally from the negotiation process. The essence of successful negotiating is communicating a clear position on an issue while still conveying a willingness to compromise.

Communication. Internal to the organization, strategic leaders communicate through a variety of direct and indirect means. Their actions and statements are always carefully analyzed. Observers are keenly sensitive to nuances of meaning.

Effective communication within the organization is important to changing, or even maintaining, direction or policy. If change is desired, large organizations can be steered on a new course only very deliberately because of their inertia. When leaders attempt change through policy, regulation, or vision, their communications are interpreted at every level. Thus, care in choice of words is essential to ensuring the desired message is received.

External to the organization, strategic leaders communicate with Congress, government agencies, national political leaders, and their constituents. This is accomplished through a variety of means. Through writing, meetings, interviews for news media, or through public speaking engagements, strategic leaders communicate for the organization. This requires clarity of thought, direction, and process. Possessing these communicative attributes, coupled with a high degree of persuasiveness, provides the leader with the necessary tools to build support, build consensus, and negotiate successfully. Communicating in a brief, clear, and persuasive manner--a considerable challenge when dealing in a vague, uncertain environment--is a competency strategic leaders must master.

“Of more immediate concern to General Powell, however, was mounting press and congressional pressure for a ‘peace dividend.’ The Chairman wished to counter criticism that the Department’s planning ignored changes in the world. Determined to convince the American people and the Congress of the need for continued U.S. engagement worldwide, General Powell had already begun publicly to articulate his strategic vision.”

The Development of the Base Force 1989-1992 by Lorna S. Jaffe, p. 28.

SUMMARY

Strategic leader competencies fall under the three rubrics of conceptual, technical, and interpersonal. These competencies are supported by a broad and rich frame of reference developed throughout the leader's life, and this enables the leader to deal with tremendously complex issues and events.

CHAPTER 6

STRATEGIC LEADERSHIP TASKS

The volatile, uncertain, complex, ambiguous nature of the environment tends to focus strategic leaders' attention on tasks associated with the present. If strategic leaders become enmeshed in short-term requirements, however, they cannot focus on the mid- and long-term tasks that only they can perform to add value to the organization. Strategic leaders must concentrate their efforts on long-term tasks while simultaneously addressing short-term requirements in the context of the organization's long-term direction. Bearing in mind the long-term direction allows rational judgments about the utility of short-term actions.

"The Army's strategic leaders operate in at least two domains: The first is in the organization they command or lead. The second is the Army as an institution where they act similar to a board of directors."

General Frederick Franks
Commander, TRADOC

While no single leader performs all the tasks associated with strategic-level leadership, the collective leadership of the organization deals with them all. Key strategic leadership tasks include the following major areas of responsibility:

- Provide vision.
- Shape culture.
- Manage joint, combined, and interagency relationships.
- Manage national-level relationships.
- Represent the organization.
- Lead and manage change.

PROVIDE VISION.

The primary task of strategic leaders is to create a vision for their organizations. The vision, which sets the tone for the future of the organization, is the first step in the development of plans and strategies for change. For a military organization, creation of the vision should include future required operating capability by considering developing concepts of future battle, emerging threat capabilities and intentions, and technology advances.

The strategic leader's vision sets the long-term direction for an organization. The solutions to short-term requirements should be consistent with the articulated vision. A

strategic leader will institutionalize a strategy to implement the vision, including the selection and mentoring of subordinate leaders to carry on the strategic vision. The other key strategic leadership tasks should all be related to communicating, developing, and implementing the strategic leader's vision.

"Moving our Army into the next century is a journey, not a destination; we know where we are going and we are moving out."

General Gordon R. Sullivan
Chief of Staff, U.S. Army

SHAPE CULTURE.

The strategic leader must take steps to shape the organization's culture in a manner that supports and helps to communicate the vision. Tasks within this area include:

- Ensuring that organizational culture is built on values deemed essential by the strategic leadership.
- Ensuring that stated values, as related to the strategic vision, are communicated throughout the organization and are internalized by its members.

In the 1980s, Secretary of the Army John Marsh initiated a series of annual themes for the Army, emphasizing the organization's core values.

- Building consensus within the organization to gain support for goals and objectives that support and implement the vision.
- Initiating structural changes and programs with distant completion dates that must be institutionalized to be achieved.
- Ensuring an organizational commitment to train other leaders by picking the right people for the right jobs.
- Ensuring the reward structure reinforces the values and behaviors you desire.

MANAGE UNIFIED, JOINT, COMBINED, AND INTERAGENCY RELATIONSHIPS.

Strategic leaders develop and manage joint and combined lateral relationships with strategic leaders of other Services, other countries, and government agencies in both peace and war. Major tasks include:

- Creating understanding and acceptance of organizational goals and national objectives and, in turn, understanding goals and objectives of other national forces.
- Creating consensus required to enable joint and combined action to be undertaken in pursuit of shared goals and objectives.
- Maintaining the knowledge and resource base that the organization requires to envision future desired outcomes and negotiating to make them happen.

Strategic leaders must actively participate in the development and sustainment of coalitions and alliances that are central to national strategy. Operating effectively in a multinational environment requires an international perspective. This task requires the strategic leader to understand the political, economic, and social factors of other countries.

As CENTCOM Commander during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, General Norman Schwarzkopf continuously demonstrated a grasp of the importance of dealing with coalition partners.

Managing the organization to achieve joint obligations is also a major task. Fulfillment of this task requires the strategic leader's commitment to joint doctrine and joint operations. The strategic leader must view the organization from a joint perspective and design internal policy and organizational structure to meet joint requirements.

Although history has many examples of ad hoc joint U.S. military operations, the joint arena has taken on added importance and emphasis since Congress passed the Goldwater-Nichols DOD Reorganization Act of 1986 (US Code cite from Title 10).

Strategic leaders must also articulate the roles and missions of the organization as they apply to the joint arena. This task requires an appreciation for the roles and missions of other Services and an understanding of their goals and objectives. The organization must be designed, equipped, trained, and maintained at a state of readiness that allows it to participate fully in joint and combined operations. This means that strategic leaders must understand and be sensitive to the cultures within which their fellow strategic leaders operate to effectively accomplish these tasks in the unified, joint, combined, and interagency arena.

Because the future portends increased emphasis on joint and combined operations in peace and war, the strategic leader's vision should identify and develop the organization's role in those arenas. Developing and sustaining coalitions, managing the organization to achieve joint obligations, and appreciating the roles and missions of other organizations in the joint arena are tasks that assist in implementing and achieving the strategic vision.

MANAGE NATIONAL-LEVEL RELATIONSHIPS.

The Congress shall have Power To ... provide for the common Defense...of the United States; ...To raise and support Armies,...To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces.

U.S. Const, Article I, Section 8

The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.

U.S. Const., Article II, Section

2

Managing relationships between the organization as a component of the nation's total defense force and the overarching national policy apparatus are major responsibilities of strategic leaders. They use their national and international frames of reference to influence opinion and build consensus for organizational roles, missions, and objectives. They garner the support of diverse players to allow the vision to be achieved.

Requirements in this area include:

- Providing advice and counsel in national policy formulation.
- Interpreting national policy guidelines and directions.
- Planning for the maintenance of the military capability required to implement national policy in the joint, combined, and interagency arenas.
- Presenting the organization's requirements for resources and capabilities.
- Developing competitive strategies.
- Bridging the gap between political decisions made as part of the national security decision process and individuals that ultimately carry out those decisions.

Strategic leaders are responsible to ensure that the leadership of the organization understands national security policy. To accomplish this task, they formulate organizational programs and policy directives that accurately interpret and reflect national security objectives. These programs and directives prepare the organization to respond to all security requirements in either peace or war.

REPRESENT THE ORGANIZATION.

The strategic leader represents the organization in its relationships with the larger society. These responsibilities include:

- Regularly communicating with elements of the Legislative, Executive, and Judicial Branches.
- Acting as a spokesperson for the organization with other Federal agencies, the media, influential people at the national level, and the public at large.
- Building and maintaining a network of information sources that can be used to understand and influence the environment.

To accomplish these tasks, strategic leaders' frames of reference must include a thorough understanding of our national culture, values, and interests and the political, economic, and military elements of national power. Strategic leaders must also be expert

in the processes and procedures for developing national security objectives, national military strategy, and the development, deployment, and use of the nation's military forces.

An understanding of current and projected national and international situations is necessary for credibility in testimony to Congress and for interactions with executives of other Federal and state agencies and leaders, the media, and others who influence national attitudes toward the military. An awareness of the outlook, values, and priorities of political leaders and those who influence public opinion requires an understanding of American society. This perspective is necessary not only for public representation, but also for shaping the culture and values of the organization as an integral part of the total society.

"In the arena in which the senior leader of the United States military exists, you've got to be persuasive with a variety of audiences. You've got to be persuasive to the internal audience of military people whom you serve. You've got to be persuasive with both major and minor bureaucrats in the Department of Defense and the Secretariat of your own service.... You've got to be persuasive in-house. Then you've got to be persuasive with the Congress and with the general public."

General Maxwell Thurman

No organization operates in a vacuum. To achieve the organizational short-term objectives and to implement the long-term vision, strategic leaders must understand how the organization fits into the national security framework. They must also build consensus within that framework, and with the nation, on the role of the organization, fitting the role to their strategic vision.

The best method to achieve consensus in a multifaceted, pluralistic system is through *networking*. Informal contacts with knowledgeable, influential people holding key positions in other organizations and agencies assist in gathering the diverse support that allows the organization's vision to be achieved. Integrity and the power of personality are keys to accomplishing this consensus-building task. Strategic leaders who have the ability to persuade others, who know how and when to compromise without abandoning principles, and who gain and maintain the trust of other influential decision-makers will go a long way toward achieving the organization's objectives.

MANAGE CHANGE.

Strategic leaders proactively manage change through the processes associated with embedding their vision within the organization and shaping organizational culture to support the vision. Achieving the vision requires change to bridge the gap between the present and the future. External environmental factors, such as the changing nature of military threats, adjustments to national military strategy, legislation affecting DOD,

changes in international alliances, and budget considerations, generate the need for change within the organization. Internally, improvements in warfighting doctrine, equipment modernization, resource adjustments resulting from technology advancements, and other factors also drive organizational change. These factors and changes may be so extensive that they periodically require that the strategic vision be revised.

*"I have conceived of many plans, but I was never free to execute one of them.
For all that I held the rudder, and with a strong hand, the waves were always
a good deal stronger."*

Napoleon

"The times we live in are times of profound change, dramatic and fundamental change -- political, ideological, and technical. We must adapt to that change, and we must grow."

General Gordon Sullivan

DOD, Joint Staff, and Service-unique strategic-level planning systems provide strategic leaders the processes to manage change in the environment of strategic leadership. Decisions made within the Joint Strategic Planning System (JSPS); the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES); the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS); and the Services' systems integration processes provide purpose and direction to lower levels of the organization. Management of change at the strategic level includes the following:

- Identifying the necessary force capabilities to accomplish the national military strategy.
- Identifying and assigning strategic and operational roles and missions, including priorities for allocating resources.
- Preparing strategies and plans for the use of military forces across the operational continuum in the unified, joint, combined, and interagency arenas.
- Creating, resourcing, and sustaining organizational structures, systems, and processes, including essential C4I systems, force modernization programs, and requisite personnel and equipment.
- Developing and improving operating doctrine and the associated training methodologies to support the doctrine.
- Understanding and planning for second- and third-order effects of actions to implement change.
- Maintaining effective leader development programs and other human resources programs.

Decision-making at the strategic level almost always requires major resource commitments that cannot easily be reversed. Continual analysis of requirements, capabilities, and risks

associated with capability shortfalls is essential to the decision-making process. Strategic leaders rely on timely, accurate feedback to prevent making decisions based on incomplete or inadequate information. Systems must be designed to be top-driven and bottom-fed. Purpose, direction, and motivation are provided from the top, while information and recommendations flow upward from within the organization.

The management of change demands that strategic leaders focus primarily on future mid- and long-range issues while dealing with current short-term requirements. This means that strategic leaders must empower subordinate echelons to implement the strategies and policies within the established framework. Effective, systematic feedback is essential to provide strategic leaders information on which to judge the progress and ultimate results of desired changes within the organization.

Empowering subordinate leaders in this fashion helps to perpetuate and implement the strategic vision. Because short-term solutions should be consistent with the long-term vision, subordinates must understand and internalize the vision to implement strategies and policies. Because the tenure of any individual strategic leader is limited, subordinate leaders must be selected, mentored, and trained to carry on the vision. The history of the United States Army has been built on great leaders who produced great subordinates.

"Great leaders produce great subordinates who, in turn, become great leaders in their own time. Our Army has built its reputation on this process. Winfield Scott developed a generation of superb officers: Ulysses S. Grant, Robert E. Lee, William T. Sherman, and Thomas J. Jackson, to name just a few. George C. Marshall learned leadership from John J. Pershing, and Marshall's followers became great captains themselves: Dwight D. Eisenhower, Omar N. Bradley, George S. Patton, Jr., and Matthew B. Ridgway among them. Scott, Pershing, and Marshall each taught their subordinates their profession; and, more importantly, they gave them room to grow."

General Gordon R. Sullivan

SUMMARY

Strategic leaders have the challenge and responsibility to lead large, complex organizations which change very slowly, with great expenditure of energy. The tasks required to meet this challenge begin with the strategic leader providing a vision to the organization. With this vision and well-articulated organizational values, strategic leaders then influence and shape their organization's culture. They also lead the organization on a daily basis, ensuring it meets all requirements in the unified, joint, combined, and interagency arenas. This task requires strategic leaders to deal with short-term challenges, including operational contingencies, consistent with mid- and long-term objectives. They

also manage the organization's relationships with all national-level agencies and organizations, representing the organization before Congress, the media, and other influential opinion groups. The objective is to gain consensus among these various groups and organizations in support of the roles and missions, goals, and objectives of the organization. Such consensus is essential to achieving the organization's vision in the strategic environment. Finally, by facilitating the management of change, strategic leaders guide the organization today while molding it to meet tomorrow's challenges.

CHAPTER 7

THE STRATEGIC LEADER AND THE HUMAN DIMENSION OF COMBAT

"The trained American possesses qualities that are almost unique. Because of his initiative and resourcefulness, his adaptability to change and his readiness to resort to expedient, he becomes, when he has attained a proficiency in all the normal techniques of battle, a formidable soldier. Yet even he has his limits; the preservation of his individual and collective strength is one of the greatest responsibilities of leadership."

Dwight D. Eisenhower
Crusade in Europe, p. 453.

No matter how involved strategic leaders may become in working to further their vision for the Army, they must always be mindful that they are leaders of an organization whose fundamental purpose is to serve the national interest by committing its personnel to the violence of battle. The phenomenon of human combat is like no other activity in which mankind engages. Within the crucible of armed conflict, those who participate are dramatically affected by the fear of death or maiming, the trauma of witnessing violent death and destruction, the grief from the loss of comrades, and the deprivation of even the simplest of life's needs.

The psychological impact of battle and the prospect of battle have a tremendous influence upon the performance of individuals and of the units of which they are members. Individuals and units that are properly conditioned, supported, and trained can minimize the adverse effects of facing and participating in sustained combat. Unfortunately, the costs of creating and sustaining the institutional processes necessary to conserve the psychological capacity of our Army to function effectively in battle often have little perceived value in the day-to-day administration and training of the force in peacetime. Thus, it is essential that strategic leaders have an appreciation for the human dimension of combat, so that they will stop external and internal influences from constricting those policies and associated resources dedicated to enhancing the psychological staying power of our Army in battle. Too often and with the best of intentions, this psychological staying power is undermined in the quest for administrative efficiency, cost-effectiveness, and peacetime mission focus.

A fundamental understanding of this human dimension can only be achieved through personal study and contemplation. Although such appreciation and understanding can result from personal combat experience, there is no level of personal experience that cannot be significantly reinforced with an analysis of the experiences of others.

Strategic leaders such as Generals Eisenhower and Arnold possessed no personal experience in the human dimension of combat before they assumed significant strategic leader responsibilities at the outset of World War II. Yet both of these distinguished strategic leaders had by that time achieved an understanding of this dimension of warfare through years of reading and reflecting upon the commentaries of those who wrote of such experiences. Every decision of each of these two strategic leaders was made only after consideration of the consequences of the decision on the soldiers and airmen who bore the brunt of battle. Each of these leaders understood the human dynamics of combat and its relationship to the psychological staying power of the forces they led.

Achieving an understanding of the human dimension of combat is a continuing professional commitment of any Army leader, but most especially the leader at the strategic level. It is a subject area that is as rich and as complex as any quest for an understanding of human nature. As such, it encompasses such diverse topics as: the value system of a society and its military; how individual values are influenced or changed; the psychological and physical manifestations of combat stress, the influences of training and conditioning to prevent or ameliorate the stress of combat; and the dynamics of unit performance and cohesion, and numerous other related topics.

In the best of all worlds, leaders will achieve the strategic level without personal experience in the human dimension of combat, because our nation is blessed with a long period of peaceful engagement. But even in the best of worlds, strategic leaders must possess a fundamental appreciation for this dimension of warfare for the very reason that our Army must always be prepared to commit its forces to combat to protect our national interests. Every decision that Army strategic leaders make, now or in the future, must be made with consideration of the impact of that decision on the psychological staying power of our soldiers and units in battle. To permit our Army to lose the proper focus on psychological readiness for sustained combat is to break faith with those soldiers who will commit themselves to the first battle of the next conflict.

Appendix A

Strategic Leader Competencies

BE (Disposition - values, attributes) :

The Values Champion - the standard bearer; beyond reproach
Master of the Strategic Art - ends, ways, means
Quintessential student of history
Comfortable with complexity
High personal stamina - physical, mental, stress management
Skilled diplomat
Possesses intellectual sophistication - alternative frames of reference, pattern recognition, and able to see 2d, 3rd, and 4th order effects

KNOW - (Disposition - skills)

Conceptual -

Envisioning - anticipating the future, proactive thinking - practices
critical, creative, reflective thinking
Frame of Reference Development - including systems understanding, scanning, pattern recognition
Problem Management - competing issues, no right answers, ability to recognize and ignore irrelevant issues.
Critical Self Examination
Critical, reflective thought
Effective within environment of complexity
Skillful formulation of ends, ways, means

Technical

Systems Understanding - political, economic, cultural, logistical, force management, and joint/combined interrelationships, etc.
Recognizes and understands interdependencies - systems, decisions, organizations, etc.
Information age technological awareness - next generation awareness, sophisticated time/space selection
Skillful application of ends, ways, means

Interpersonal

Communication - to a much broader audience; negotiations, consensus building across a variety of stakeholders; systems knowledge; sophisticated persuasion skills
Inspires others to act
Organizational representation - to internal and external audiences/stakeholders
Skillful coordination of ends, ways, means
Master of command and peer leadership

DO (Action - influencing, operating, and improving):

Provide for the future - visioning (long term focus, time span, perspective)

Initiator of policy and directive

Shape the Culture - Values based organization

leverage diversity, understanding and accepting differences, multiple perspectives

Teaches and mentors the strategic art

Manage Joint/Combined and Interagency Relationships

Manage National Level Relationships

Represent the Organization

Leverage Technology

Leads and Manages Change - creating and building “learning organizations”

Builds Teams and Consensus at Strategic Level (can’t dictate action at this level) - co-opting, coalition building, negotiating, etc.

Practices the Strategic Art

- allocates resources
- develops & executes strategic plans derived from the interagency process

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